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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Leading Articles
LAW MAKING BY PROFESSIONAL AND TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS*
Frederick K. Beutel**
When the government of the United States was established,
it adopted in its complete form the English legislative system
which existed at the foundation of the colonies.' This structure,
including the committee systems, has come down almost un-
changed to modern times. In addition there are in the United
States fifty other independent law-making bodies having a large
measure of sovereignty of their own which govern the forty-eight
states and our two major territories now petitioning for state-
hood. To these there should be added over one hundred thousand2
local legislative bodies such as city councils, county commissioners.
school boards, irrigation districts and the like-all with some de-
gree of sovereign law-making power. Connected with and sub-
sidiary to all these more-or-less independent law-making bodies
within their own jurisdiction are myriads of administrative units
with delegated legislative rule-making powers-such rules having
the force of law when they are applied.
The output of all of these organs of law-making bodies is
astronomical both in volume and diversity. A glance at the Stat-
utes at Large will show that the average Federal Congress alone
enacts over fifteen hundred 3 laws per session out of about ten
times that number of bills introduced. When there is added to
this product, the session laws of the fifty state and territorial
legislatures, the rules of the federal administrative bodies found
in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, to-
gether with their counterparts in all the states, some of which are
* Report delivered at Academy of International and Comparative Law.
August 1, 1954.
Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1 See Harlow, Legislative Methods in the Period Before 1825 c. I
(1917); Atkins, Lex Parliamentarie (1748); Hurst, The Growth of Ameri-
can Law, The Law Makers c. 2 (1950).
2Anderson, The Units of Government, Pub. Ad. Serv. No. 42, 11 (1934).
2 This figure does not include joint resolutions or reorganization plans.
For example see Calendar of the House, 79th Cong. 303 (1945).
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not even published, it become obvious that it would be more than
a full-time task for a substantial research body to attempt to
understand and digest this crop of current legislation. This may
be the reason why there is not in existence a workable centralized
index to this subject corresponding to the American Digest Sys-
tem covering court decisions.
There are two major characteristics of all American law-mak-
ing bodies. With rare exceptions found only in some administra-
tive agencies, the law makers are elected or appointed officials
with no previous expert knowledge of the myriad subjects upon
which they are expected to legislate. Outside of some adminis-
trative agencies, the "legislatures" are almost entirely devoid of
expert advisors who are part of the legislative system, and they
rely largely upon personal contact or hearings for their know-
ledge of the subject matter of the laws which they are expected
to create. The second characteristic of American legislative bodies
is that they are all tribunals of limited jurisdiction. These are
limitations both of territory and subject matter. For example,
interstate commerce is governed by Congress but powers over
intrastate commerce and interstate commerce where the Federal
Government has not acted are split up geographically among the
fifty states and territories. Within the state and territorial limi-
tations there are further jurisdictional divisions for cities, coun-
ties, and other areas. If one were to drive cross country from
New York to Los Angeles, he would pass through literally thou-
sands of legal jurisdictions each having its own code of traffic
regulations, few of which are uniform.
I. The Pressure of Organized Interests on Legislation
The legislatures themselves on their various levels must rely
largely for information upon voluntary approach by interested
persons either in lobby activities or at the hearings. Chief among
those contacting the law makers with information and requests
for action are representatives of numerous voluntary organiza-
tions whose combined activity is commonly said to constitute the
lobby.
It is commonplace that lobbying has been recognized as a
practical and legal part of law making. Lobbyists are always ad-
mitted to hearings and often to the floor of law-making bodies.
In the State of Nebraska, for example, registered lobbyists, who
legally take part in lawmaking and even have a space reserved
for them on the floor of the Unicameral Legislature, outnumber
the elected senators by approximately two to one. This may be
taken as a modest measure of the average which obtains in all
American legislative bodies.
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Many of these lobbyists are regularly constituted representa-
tives or members of the various voluntary national associations
which number over four thousand and represent trade, business,
professional, educational, racial, religious, fraternal, public of-
ficial, patriotic and numerous other organized interests. Together
with their local divisions these organizations maintain over six-
teen thousand national, state, and local headquaiters. it would
be impossible in an article of this kind to attempt to summarize
in detail the nature of the activities involved in this group of as-
sociations. The mere listing of their addresses and a short sum-
mary of their activities fills a substantial volume which is by no
means exhaustive of all such business and professional associa-
tions in the United States.4 It is fair to say, however, that at
some time or other almost everyone of these organizations has
been known to take part in a limited or very extensive way in
lobbying and other law-making activities.
Although it is impossible to be concerned here with a detailed
census of these law-making activities by professional and trade
associations, it might be worthwhile to describe briefly some of
the legally recognized devices for transmitting the pressures from
these groups into law. One familiar with the subject will recog-
nize at least three areas in which these organizations exercise a
very potent influence. The first is legislative and administra-
tive hearings of various kinds which are the common habitat of
the lobbyist and need not be discussed here.5 The second, is the
legally recognized delegation of law-making powers under which
affected professional and trade organizations are required or al-
lowed to bring in information, to fill in details, or to vote on
variations of laws or rules which are later to have the effect of
law. The third is the situation where the bill which is intended
to be law is drafted within the association itself and presented to
the law-making body as a finished product ready for enactment.
In both of these latter fields, professional and trade associations
exercise law-making power that is far beyond anything known at
the time of the origin and crystallization of our legislative sys-
tems and therefore beyond the contemplation of the founding
fathers.
II. Government Cooperation with Associations in Law Making
The delegation of law-making power to administrative bodies
4Judkins, National Associations of the United States c. vii (1949).
5 For the distribution of these pressures in Massachusetts, see Beutel,
The Pressure of Organized Interests as a Factor in Shaping Legislation,
3 So. Cal. L. Rev. 10 (1929).
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is a well-recognized phenomenon and needs only passing attention
here. As is well known this activity reached its height under the
National Industrial Recovery Act6 by which the Federal Govern-
ment attempted to recognize the needs of trade associations and
bring them directly into the law-making process by the creation
of the so-called codes of fair competition. With this pervasive bit
of law-making machinery, under which the business and trade
activities of the entire United States were attempted to be govern-
ed by codes, there were created and approved over seven hundred
and fifty official codes of fair competition 7 governing most of the
aspects of assembling raw materials, labor relations, manufac-
turing and regulation of competition of every type of business
unit. In addition to the codes which actually received approval
there were thousands of others in process when the Federal Gov-
ernment realized that it had created a monster and the Supreme
Court obligingly declared the whole process unconstitutional.8
Although this was the widest effort to take trade and pro-
fessional associations into the law-making machinery, its consti-
tutional demise by no means ended the process. There are on the
books many statutes providing that particular administrative agen-
cies in their rule-making power shall consult or cooperate with
various trade associations. The task of merely listing such federal
and state laws would require extensive and expensive research.
A few examples will suffice here. Under agricultural laws gov-
erning the production of milk9 and other products, 0 distributors
and farmers may vote to determine when certain quota laws com-
piled by administrative officers with cooperation of the people
regulated shall take effect. In the field of bituminous coal", and
under the Fair Labor Standards Act1 2 committees from the in-
dustry have a broad say as to the law governing labor and the
compensation paid to workers.
Similar state statutes granting such control over production
and requiring the concurrence of the persons regulated before the
G 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
7 Rees, N.R.A. Economic Planning 537 (1937).
s Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
950 Stat. 246. 247(19) (1937), 7 U.S.C. § 608(c)(5), (19) (1952);
United States v. Rock Royal, 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
1048 Stat. 31 and 49 Stat. 750 (1935), 7 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1952);
see Edwards v. United States, 91 F.2d 767, 788 (9th Cir. 1937).
11 50 Stat. 72 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 828 (1941); see Sunshine Coal Co.
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940).
1252 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 205 (1941); see Opp Cotton
Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 146 (1940).
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rules have the effect of law are common phenomena.13 In all of
these instances, however, it is to be noted that the regularly con-
stituted government officials retain control over the rule-making
process; and no rule becomes law without a careful analysis of
its material and content by officials who have expert aid, are
under the control of the government and, to a large extent, are
compensated from the public and not private budgets.
III. Complete Law Making by Professional and
Trade Associations
There remains a large field of law-making activity which
falls into the third class indicated above. Where the law is drafted
within the professional or trade association itself and where the
determination of its provisions has passed out of the control of
regularly constituted governmental officials, the legislature or
government official is little more than a rubber stamp or a co-
operating tool of the association. This usually occurs in areas
where the nature and subject matter of the law to be enacted is
so complicated or technical that the legislator because of his own
lack of knowledge of the subject of the proposed law and because
the government supplies him with no technical staff is unable to
cope with the problems involved. When this situation arises the
law is created in the professional association itself and may often
pass through the legislative body without the law makers knowing
what they are doing, but simply relying on the integrity of the
association or yielding to its pressure in passing the law.
The volume and nature of statutes created by this process is
far larger than even lawyers and legislatures themselves realize.
Statutes of this kind created wholly by interested associations are
to be found on both the state and federal level. Sometimes they
are out-and-out class legislation created by the associations, for
the associations and to the detriment of all their competitors or
customers. In other instances they are brought forward by the
association as a public service in the interest of creating uni-
formity among the states, the advancement of science or some
other laudatory end. The first type of law created by the associa-
tion-the pure class legislation-is know to all legislators; but
is not always easily recognizable either by the amateur legislator
or even a professional legislative expert. Such bills are usually
drafted in the association intended to be benefited by its own legal
staff and handed complete to some obliging member of the legisla-
tive body who, either innocent of its implications or knowingly,
13For example, see Cal. Gen. Laws art. 146.1 § 9 (1944); 17 Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 598.12 (1943).
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drops it into the hopper and starts it on its way through the hear-
ings and the legislative process. Although some of its proponents
may recognize its purpose, bills of this kind are usually disguised
as something for the public benefit. On the federal level the re-
cent Tidelands Oil Legislation is a well-known example of this
sort of thing. On the state level a recent amendment to the pub-
lic housing authority acts, providing that no public facilities such
as water, light, and sewage were to be furnished to public housing
projects without a referendum by the people of the area involved,
is a beautiful example of such a law.14 It was drafted by a na-
tional real estate association and introduced simultaneously into
many legislatures with the obvious intent of killing public housing
activity by the simple device of making it administratively im-
possible under the guise that it was "democratic" to require public
approval by an area-wide election of many of its details. A simi-
lar act on the state level was the so-called Bank Collection Code
which has been adopted in eighteen states.15 This act, drafted by
counsel of the American Bankers' Association for the purpose of
throwing all the risk and cost of the bank collection process on
the depositors and retaining the profits and control in the banks,
has been declared invalid as class legislation by at least two juris-
dictions' But it is still the governing law in eighteen of our
leading commercial states. Other examples of this sort of thing
are the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 1 7 and the proposed
so-called Bricker Amendment to the Constitution,0 both of which
were drafted by committees of the American Bar Association.
The former is an attempt to force judicial processes and judicial
review upon all administrative agencies which would not have
existed had the judicial process been able to cope with the prob-
lems which they were created to solve.
IV. The Creation of Uniform Laws
A second field where law making by private associations has
become dominant and commonly accepted is in the area of Uni-
form Laws. Although trade, transportation, and even social ac-
tivities have become nation-wide, jurisdiction over these activities
remains split among fifty state and territorial legislatures and
thousands of local law-making bodies. There is, therefore, a con-
14Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-1504, 71-1507 (Reissue 1952).
1r See Beutel's Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 133 (1948).
15 See Beutel's Brannan. Negotiable Instruments Law 133 (7th ed. 1948).
16 People v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 362 Ill. 164, 199 N.E. 272 (1935);
Note, 104 A.L.R. 1090 (1936); Jennings v. United States, 294 U.S. 216
(1935); cf. In re Riverton State Bank, 48 Wyo. 372, 49 P.2d 637 (1935).
17 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1952).
i See Sen. Rep. No. 412, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
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stant pressure that nation-wide activities be governed by uniform
statutes and it is in this field where the drafting of laws has en-
tirely been taken away from the local legislatures and placed in
hands beyond their control.
In some instances federal agencies in cooperation with trade
and professional associations have created statutes intended to he
uniformly adopted among the states, cities, and counties. Here
the federal body takes some responsibility for the drafting of the
law in cooperation with national associations. The local legislative
bodies are then expected to adopt the model law as drafted. Ex-
amples of this sort are numerous and the laws created due to the
supervision of federal officials have usually been of excellent quali-
ty. Among these are the standard ordinances governing purity of
milk' 9 adopted in thirty-two jurisdictions having a population of
over fifty-eight million people,20 motor vehicle codes,21 and sani-
tary regulations for dining, and other food handling22 facilities.23
These laws have been scientifically drafted and their effects care-
fully watched and checked by the federal agencies.2  No parti-
19Milk Ordinance and Code, Pub. Health Bull., F.S.A. 220 (1939).
20 Lidt of American communities in which the Milk Ordinance recom-
mended by the Public Health Service is in effect, Div. of Sanitation, F.S.A.
(1950).
21 Model Traffic Ordinances, Part II, Dept. of Agri. § 3 at 12, 13 (1934);
Uniform Vehicle Code, Act V, Pub. Rds. Adm'n. §§ 28, 57-59, 6OB, 161,
163 (1945). For the adoption of the model traffic ordinance and the
uniform state statutes see Report of Committee on Laws and Ordinances,
The President's Highway Safety Conference 17, 45-47 (1949); see Report
of Committee on Laws and Ordinances, The President's Highway Safety
Conference 19 (1949), showing the states that have adopted Act V of
the Uniform Vehicle Code.22 Ordinance and Code Regulating Eating and Drinking Establishments,
Pub. Health Serv. Pub. No. 37 (1943).
23 See handbooks: Railroad Servicing Areas, F.S.A., Pub. Health Serv.
Pub. No. 66 (1951); Dining Cars in Operation, F.S.A., Pub. Health Serv.
Pub. No. 83 (1951); Railroad Passenger Car Construction, F.S.A., Pub.
Health Serv. Pub. No. 95 (1951); Vessels in Operation, F.S.A., Pub.
Health Serv. Pub. No. 68 (1951).
24 For example, see Fuchs and Koeze, Results of the Operation of the
Standard Milk Ordinance in Mississippi, 45 Pub. Health Rep. 1412 (June
1930); Clark and Johnson, Results of the Operation of the Standard Milk
Ordinance in Missouri, 46 Pub. Health Rep. 1413 (June 1931); Fuchs,
Trade Barriers in the Milk Industry, 10 J. of Milk and Food Technology
195 (July 1947); Thomas, Levine and Black, Studies Showing the Effect
of Changes in the New (9th) Edition of Standard Methods in Regulation
of the Bacteriological Analysis of Milk, 38 Am. J. of Pub. Health 233
(Feb. 1948); Black, Effects of Contemplated Changes in Standard Methods,
11 J. of Milk and Food Technology No. 4 (July, Aug. 1948). See also
Dahlberg, Adams and Held, Sanitary Milk Control, Nat. Acad. of Set., Nat.
Research Council No. 250 (1953).
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cular harm has been done here by the fact that the local legisla-
tures have lost control over these statutes.
There are other areas of uniform laws, however, where this
is not the case. There the statutes are drafted completely under
the control of private organizations not responsible to any govern-
ment agency and presented to the legislature as an accomplished
fact ready for enactment. The complicated nature of these laws
is such that the legislatures with their medieval structure and
lack of research machinery are unable to analyze them. Further,
the valid argument for uniformity makes such analysis undesir-
able insofar as it would result in change by individual states.
The law maker receives the statute on a take-it-or-leave-it basis
under a strong pressure for uniformity of law which has been
created by the standardization and mass production processes in
our civilization. The extent of legislative abdication in this field
and the adoption of a system of private law making is quite
shocking. Such statutes are created by many organizations, in-
cluding the American Bankers' Association, the real estate lobby
already mentioned, the National Maufacturers' Association, the
Chamber of Commerce, national labor unions, medical associations,
which devised the famous "Briggs Law" of Massachusetts 25 cover-
ing some aspects of psychiatric criminology, by simply copying
statutes from other states and by many other means.
The most active of all assoeiations in this field as one might
expect has been the American Bar Association, operating through
its so-called Commission on Uniform Laws. The Commission on
Uniform Laws is a subsidiary of the American Bar Association
created specifically for drafting and pushing the enactment of
uniform statutes. This Commission was begun as a branch ac-
tivity of the American Bar Association in 1889 when the Associa-
tion appointed a special committee on uniform laws. Partly due
to the pressure of this committee the various state governments
have adopted statutes under which the governor appoints two or
more Commissioners on Uniform Laws. These gentlemen are
members of the American Bar Association, serve without pay,
meet annually with the Bar Association to draft uniform statutes
on all sorts of subjects which are then offered to the legislatures
of the various states for adoption. The history and activity of
this Commission have been set out in detail elsewhere26 and need
25 See Weihoffen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law 401 (1933).
26 See The Handbook of National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form Laws 525 (1952) which contains the complete history and proceed-
ings of the organization; Hurst, op. cit. supra note 1, at 363.
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not be repeated here other than to note that in the approximately
sixty years of its existence it has drafted or approved over one
hundred and thirty separate acts mostly in the field of commer-
cial law, but covering additional areas such as marriage and di-
vorce, real property, veterans' rights, probate of wills, proof of
paternity, and hundreds of other subjects. So active has been
this law-making organization that its output has resulted in over
thirteen hundred and fifty separate statutes adopted in the vari-
ous states or an average of approximately thirty statutes per state.
In the commercial field where these acts are best known, they
cover a subject matter broader than the commercial codes of
Europe. In addition they operate in areas of paternity, wills,
trusts, estates, criminal extradition, narcotic drugs and many
other fields27 closely affecting individual persons and their rights.
They exert a very wide influence. A glance at the annual Hand-
book of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws will show in detail the extent to which the law-making
activities of the American Bar Association have completely dis-
placed the legislatures in a wide area governing the intimate and
commercial activities and contacts of the citizen with his fellow-
men .2  All of this activity has been ostensibly carried on pro bono
publico. But it should be observed that although the governors of
the various states may appoint the Commissioners on Uniform
Laws, they exert no control over their activities. The work of
the Commission is purely a Bar Association operation under the
direction of that Association, financed by the Association; and
none of its laws is offered for approval of the state legislatures
without first having been approved by the Bar Association. 9 As
will be seen later this process contains the potentiality of danger-
ous class legislation.
Recently private law making has received further impetus in
the activities of the American Law Institute. This private and
purely voluntary organization, which had its origin in a scholarly
attemtp to restate the common law, has now moved into the broad
field of legislative activity. The Institute, like the Commission
on Uniform Laws, is also an adjunct of the American Bar Associ-
ation. Although on paper it is an independent entity made up of
prominent lawyers, judges, and outstanding law professors, it is
common knowledge that it is controlled by the same group of blue-
27 For the scope and extent of these laws and the states where they
have been adopted, see Uniform Laws Ann., a series of reports on these
laws.
28 See note 26 supra.
29 See note 26 supra, at 527.
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stocking lawyers who run the American Bar Association and the
Commission on Uniform Laws. Like the latter it attempts to
operate pro bono publico and receives its financial support from
large endowments such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Frick
Foundation, and the Carnegie Endowment. Since the completion
of the Restatements, the Institute has gone very strongly into the
field of law making. First among its recent activities in this area
are the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Youth Correction Au-
thority Act, the Model Code of Evidence, the Uniform Commercial
Code, recently completed in cooperation with the Commission on
Uniform Laws, the Model Penal Code and the Federal Income Tax
Statute.30 In their sweep and scope these last three undertakings
will be immediately recognized as tremendous projects. Here is
an attempt by a private body to codify most of the commercial
law, to reorganize the penal law and to re-draft the federal in-
come tax statutes-the greatest source of present income to the
Federal Government. The cost of the research and compilation of
these three statutes alone which will run into millions of dollars
is being supplied wholly from private funds.
It should be noted also that in the case of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Penal Code the drafts when finished will
nave to be final because of the complicated nature of the material
with which they deal and the fact that they are drafted for uni-
form adoption. Because of their complexity and desire for uni-
formity, material changes by the state legislatures to which they
are being presented for adoption is inadvisable.
V. Dangerous Defects in Private Law Making
The false implications in such private legislation and its threat
to the fairness of government and the democratic process should
be apparent to all thoughtful persons. The following brief sum-
mary of arguments against the continuation of such a system of
law making shows that its dangers are not only theoretical, but
are present and real.
In the first place it should be recognized that where uniform
laws are drafted by interested associations the law-making pro-
cess receives the benefit of the knowledge of individuals and groups
most intimately acquainted with the field which the laws attempt
to regulate. The draftsmen under these circumstances, it is ar-
gued, are experts. But their expertness comes at a high price.
No matter how public spirited the draftsmen and the persons pro-
moting the statute are, or pretend to be, even an honest person's
ideas of fairness are bound to be infuenced by his own interests
30 See A.L.I. Annual Report (1953).
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or those of his client. Thus, the interests of the association for
which they are working as against the good of the rest of the
body politic inevitably receives paramount consideration. Since
the statute is promoted and drafted by experts, the interests of the
particular organization promoting the statute receive expert pro-
tection. Examples of this may be found in the Bank Collection
Code mentioned above which was drafted by counsel of the Ameri-
can Bankers' Association, but which was so one-sided in its out-
look and which so expertly protected the interests of the bankers
that it was declared invalid by the courts because it was class
legislation running contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution. In like fashion the Federal Administrative Proce-
dure Act, although it is ostensibly an effort to force fairness upon
administrative agencies, adopts for itself in the name of fairness
the pattern of judicial process which is best known to and a
monopoly of its promoters-the legal profession. As experience
has shown, such procedure is not fitted to the problems which
many administrative agencies falling under its ken are supposed
to solve.31
Another obvious difficulty is that important social interests
other than those of the promoting organization are excluded or
ignored in the drafting and are often muscled out of the regularly
constituted legislative hearings before which the draft of the law
is presented. This was the case with the Federal Administrative
Procedure Bill. This act, although it was denounced by most of the
federal administrative agencies and by many impartial experts
in the field, 32 was shepherded through Congress by a committee
of the bar which even went so far as to stack the hearing process
so that opponents of the bill were denied opportunity to testify
against it. 33 This is only one of many examples where a profes-
sional or business association has created a statute favorable to
itself and shephered it through the legislative process with the
connivance or tolerance of the legislators themselves. The process
31 For one example of the failure of this act, see Fuchs, The Hearing
Examiner Fiasco under the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Harv. L. Rev.
737 (1950).
32 For an early discussion of the bill and problems involved, see Beutel,
The Problem of Reform of Administrative Procedure, 6 Fed. B.J. 264
(1945).
33 The congressmen promoting the Administrative Procedure Act twice
adjourned the appointed hearings when the writer and other experts were
to testify against the bill. So successful was this maneuvering that this
adverse testimony never appeared in the record which was used extensively
in later arguments in support of the bill.
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by which this is accomplished has been discussed at length else-
where34 and need not be further examined here.
In the case of bills drafted by legal organizations, such as
the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute,
there is grave danger that the interests of the clients retaining the
lawyers most influential in its organization and in its drafting
process will receive tremendous advantages at the expense of
other interests represented by lawyers who are membrs but not
particularly influential in the little group which promotes the
statutes. The reasons for this are numerous. In the first place
bar associations, the American Law Institute and other organiza-
tions promoting uniform statutes are only sparetime organiza-
tions. All of their important policy-making officials and most of
the draftsmen who actually undertake the work of compiling the
statutes devote only their leisure time to the activity.35 Thus it
is easy for particular interests pushed by active members of the
association to gain advantage in the law-making process because
there is nobody giving his major attention to the intricate problem
of determining that the proposed statute is fair. This is left to
the entire group which has little time to give expert analysis to
the details of the proposed statutes. Individual lawyers who can
give their attention to the work, usually retained by wealthy
clients, are able to manipulate the machinery of the association
and to exert influence for themselves and their clients, far out of
proportion to their proper position as representatives of the in-
terest affected by the statute.3 6 Thus, it was possible in the Ameri-
can Law Institute for certain influential lawyers representing
bankers to have the Institute approve Article 4 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, Bank Deposits and Collections, which, as demon-
strated elsewhere,37 is an even worse piece of class legislation than
the Bank Collection Code. In like manner a few influential mem-
bers of the American Bar Association, representing a small group
of rich isolationists, were able to get the approval of the entire
34 See Cohen, Hearing on a Bill: Legislative Folklore, 37 Minn. L. Rev.
34 (1952).
35 William Draper Lewis was a full-time Director of the American Law
Institute; but since his passing, its major officers, like those in the Bar
Association, devote their major efforts to other legal activities.
36 For the extent to which this happened in the drafting of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, see Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code as a Problem in Codification, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 140, 142
(1951); Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should not
be Adopted, 61 Yale L.J. 334, 358 (1952).
37 See Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should not
be Adopted, supra note 36, confirmed by Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial
Code: A reply to Professor Beutel, 61 Yale L.J. 364, 374 (1952).
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Association of the Bricker Amendment. It is highly doubtful
whether this proposed constitutional amendment, even though it
carries the official approval of the Association, represents either
the sentiment of all the members of the Bar Association or the
considered judgment of the majority of those present at the time
the convention approved the proposed constitutional amendment.
Anyone familiar with the interior politics of associations could
add many more examples of how this process works to the detri-
ment of all but a few special interests.
Professional organizations, like the bar associations, also seek
the alliance of other powerful interests to help them push their
acts through the legislature. What is more natural, then, to get
this support, than to make concessions to these interests in the
drafting of the statute? This was a familiar process in the crea-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code,38 and the unfair condition
of Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections, of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
Once the statute begins to take concrete form and receives
the approval of the promoting association, pressure for profes-
sional solidarity is such that even experts in the field hesitate to
oppose the entire organization, finding it more advantageous to
go along with provisions they do not approve because of fear of
losing professional contacts and standing before the association.
So even though very strong draftsmen of the Commercial Code
have admitted that they do not agree with Article 4,30 none of
them has seen fit to oppose it openly, and very few active members
of the Institute have taken a position against any of the provi-
sions of the proposed Commercial Code. Almost all the opposi-
tion has come from a small group of law teachers 40 beyond the
reach of Institute favors. If this can happen, as it has happened
in the American Law Institute, there is no doubt that it is an
everyday occurrence in other more partial and admittedly special
interest representing associations.
A final defect in law making of this type is that there is no
machinery in our entire American law-making process to correct
imperfections of the nature indicated, even after they are dis-
covered. Once the law has been drafted and has been presented
38 Supra note 30, at 12.
39 Gilmore, supra note 37.
40 For example, see Williston. The Law of Sales in the Proposed Com-
mercial Code, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1950); Rabel, Sales Law in the
Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 427, 428 (1950);
Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 114 (1951).
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to the legislatures for adoption, the necessary pressure for uni-
formity puts it on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Amendment is dif-
ficult, if not almost impossible, because the very proper purpose
of the act, to achieve uniformity, would thereby be destroyed. If
the law has some good features which improve current conditions,
the urge is strong to take the bad with the good. The legal sys-
tem is pushed out of balance with no means of righting the bad
effect of the law. There is no legislative body which has jurisdic-
tion over the entire field attempted to be covered by proposed uni-
form statutes. With rare exceptions41 few have experts to analyze
a proposed law or to make studies of the effect of the laws after
they are adopted. When one considers that the American Law
Institute expended about a half million dollars on the drafting of
the Commercial Code, it can be seen at a glance that the cost of
analysis and study of the social effects of such a Code would be
astronomical. No individual state government could be expected
to undertake such a task. Since there is no ministry of justice in
the United States, 42 there is no official central body to do it. As
a result no one is in a position to point out either the prospective
dangers or actual bad effects of uniform or any other laws.
Our present legislative machinery relies preponderately on
voluntary complaints from interested members of the public to
determine the concrete results of such statutes. But without or-
ganized study and highly financed effort, such complaints are
likely to be both sporadic and ineffective. The law is so compli-
cated that the average person cannot hope to know its effects or
which of its many provisions are causing unfair advantages to
certain interests or detriment to others. And even if he did have
such information, he does not have the financial backing to make
his complaints effective. Only big associations can take such
steps; but most of them represent special interests which are
either directly effective in the organizations drafting the laws or
they create their own new laws to achieve their special desires.
The interests of the great mass of the public are thus pushed
further and further out of the law-making process. For example,
the depositors are not represented in any private organization
which drafts banking laws. Labor, debtors, installment pur-
41 For example, New York has a part-time expert body in the Law Revi-
sion Commission which is doing good work on these lines, and has been
especially effective in critically examining the proposed Commercial Code.
See its Annual Reports. It is spending over $300,000 studying the pro-
posed Commercial Code. The Judicial Councils of some states also are
entering the field; but most of them are almost impotent. Cf. Hurst, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 65.
42 See Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113 (1911).
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chasers, customers, and insurance policy owners are not present
at any of the meetings of the American Bar Association or the
American Law Institute, and even their attorneys are seldom ac-
tive in the organizations which have now taken over the drafting
of most of our commercial law and are beginning to invade even
the field of control over international relations.
VI. Suggested Remedies
Remedies to offset the dangers inherent in our system of law
making by private associations are many and some involved dras-
tice changes in our legislative system.
In the first place it should be recognized that the American
legislative system was created to govern a civilization which dis-
appeared with the flowering of the Industrial Revolution.43 Re-
organization of our entire legislative structure has for a long time
been an immediate and crying need. If our national and state
legislative bodies are to keep abreast of their work, they must be
equipped immediately with full-time research agencies to study
the effect of law, with a staff of experts in the fields which the
law attempts to regulate and with skilled draftsmen capable of
performing the tasks which are now volunteered by the profes-
sional associations.
There must also be created further centralization and control
of the lawmaking functions. The pressure for uniformity has
come on account of the numerous geographical and jurisdictional
divisions of power among our various law-making bodies. This,
of course, means that our national and even international govern-
ments must exert a firmer control over law-making power in
those fields where uniformity is essential to the operation of our
civilization. These larger national and international bodies are
the only ones who can afford the expense and command the talent
necessary to carry out properly and impartially tasks of the magni-
tude represented by such a statute as the Uniform Commercial
Code.
Of course, it must be recognized that this ultimate solution is
one very difficult to achieve. It would not only require numerous
constitutional amendments both state and local, the wiping out
and consolidation of many units of governments such as cities and
counties, but it is also contrary to the dominant political trend in
the United States which at the moment is promoting the reac-
tionary process of strengthening local government.
43 This change is dramatically portrayed in Lynd and Lynd, Middletown
10 (1929).
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Less drastic but necessary reforms would indicate that con-
trol of such bodies as the Uniform Laws Commission and the
American Law Institute must be taken out of the hands of private
organizations and be supplanted by research bodies like the Coun-
cil of State Governments 4 4 but financed by both the state and
federal governments. The law-making functions of these organi-
zations should be returned to the central government agencies,
heavily financed from tax funds and responsible to governmental
units only. This, of course, would increase the immediate burden
on the taxpayers; but it would save the public a far larger sum
of money which is now going into the hands of special interests
as a result of laws drafted by them especially to favor themselves
in commercial transactions. If such a body were created, it is
axiomatic that the business and professional associations whose
interests its laws touched would, of course, be consulted. But the
problem of drafting the laws should be left to the government
experts and not to the associations. As was partly the case under
the National Industrial Recovery Act, recommendations of the
associations and similar interests should be cleared through an
expert staff fully equipped with research machinery to determine
the prospective and actual effects of the law upon other mem-
bers of the body politic not represented by the pressure from or-
ganized associations. When all the information was gathered,
the experts could then draft and recommend to state and other
legislatures uniform statutes with much more certainty of fair-
ness than is now the case where the entire process is in private
hands. This latter suggestion could be accomplished without any
constitutional amendments, either state or federal, simply by the
use of the compact power now available in the Federal Constitu-
tion.
It should be noted that either of the reforms suggested re-
quires a drastic change in the present concept of the democratic
process of legislation. But such a reform is not so great as the
revolutionary change which has taken place in the nature and
structure of our civilization since the founding fathers created
the Constitution in 1789. This is the age of complication and
specialization in all fields. If our legal system is not to be sub-
jugated completely by selfish interests which are promoting their
own ends to distort the law, the control of the law-making process
must be returned to expert and impartial governmental bodies.
44 This organization is financed entirely by appropriations by the states
and by the sale of its publications. Its yearly budget now exceeds $400,000.
See Baine, Annual Report of the Council of State Government, 26 State
Gov't 17, 21 (1953).
